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PREFACE
I first became interested in the SNMP protocol while working for the Georgia Tech
Research Institute. As a co-op student, one of the responsibilities that I took on was
monitoring and maintaining the network. In the course of doing so, I spent much of
my time configuring Network Management Software (NMS).
While working with our NMS, I quickly realized the flexibility afforded by extend-
ing our SNMP agents. By extending agents, I could run almost any check I wanted
by using the agent to execute scripts. What dawned on me very quickly, however,
was that to use this functionality, I absolutely needed to be using SNMP in a secure
manner. This was what initially sparked my interest in the protocol.
In the course of learning to use SNMPv3, I found that I was learning a great deal
about the protocol. This was partially a result of my curiosity, and also partially due
to inadequate documentation.
After returning to the Georgia Institute of Technology as a graduate student, I
was fortunate enough to take a Network Security class with Professor Traynor. The
project for this class provided me with both the opportunity and the motivation to
really learn the details of the protocol. After many hours of reading through RFCs,
I found several issues with the protocol which were the subject of my project, and
which eventually became this thesis and a paper.
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SUMMARY
Network monitoring is a necessity for both reducing downtime and ensuring
rapid response in the case of software or hardware failure. Unfortunately, one of the
most widely used protocols for monitoring networks, the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3), does not offer an acceptable level of confidentiality or integrity
for these services. In this paper, we demonstrate two attacks against the most current
and secure version of the protocol with authentication and encryption enabled. In
particular, we demonstrate that under reasonable conditions, we can read encrypted
requests and forge messages between the network monitor and the hosts it observes.
Such attacks are made possible by an insecure discovery mechanism, which allows
an adversary capable of compromising a single network host to set the keys used by
the security functions. Our attacks show that SNMPv3 places too much trust on the





Managing large networks can be a daunting task. Such systems regularly contain
thousands of devices, ranging from traditional desktop computers and servers to
switches, printers and IP-enabled appliances. Ensuring that all such devices remain
responsive and that they perform their assigned duties requires significant resources
from the network operator. Fortunately, tools and protocols such as the Simple Net-
work Management Protocol (SNMP) exist to assist in this process.
While a number of features associated with SNMP have changed since its initial
standardization[12], the most important revisions in the current release of this proto-
col (SNMPv3) focus on security. Requests to view status and change settings can now
be both authenticated and made confidential, reducing the attack surface within a
network. While the individual constructions used to provide these security guarantees
are well understood (e.g., HMAC), the overall security of the protocol itself has not
been evaluated. Accordingly, we are left with the following question: Does SNMPv3
achieve the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees that it aims to provide?
In this paper, we demonstrate that SNMPv3 fails to provide its advertised secu-
rity guarantees. First, we demonstrate that the contents of encrypted messages to
any host in the network can be recovered through the compromise of only a single
machine. Second, we then demonstrate that spoofed messages that pass all authenti-
cation checks can be injected for any host in the network using the same compromised
platform. In some cases checks can also be redirected to other hosts without com-
promising a host. The vulnerabilities we demonstrate are implementation-agnostic,
and demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the current protocol. This flaw occurs in the
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discovery mechanism used in the User-based Security Model for SNMPv3. Discov-
ery is primarily used to exchange identifiers and timing information between agents.
Unfortunately, it also partially determines the encryption and authentication keys
used for SNMP GetRequests and SetRequests. As discovery messages are sent un-
encrypted and unauthenticated, this allows a MITM to manipulate the keys used to
protect the integrity and confidentiality of the SNMP messages. Because the discov-
ery mechanism is itself vulnerable, it can be manipulated to allow an attacker to select
the encryption and authentication keys used by the protocol. Successfully executed,
such attacks could potentially allow an adversary to reveal information about devices
within the network, as well as to potentially modify device behavior. For instance,
on a UPS it may be possible to disable the audible alarms, modify the nominal in-
put/output voltages and frequencies, or shut it down remotely [11]. Other devices
such as switches may allow modification of security settings which include: disabling
protection from unicast flooding, disabling port security, or changing the list of secure
MAC addresses [14].
We implement and demonstrate both of our attacks in a network using Nagios[3]
and Net-SNMP[4], one of the most widely used implementations of SNMPv3. We then
discuss considerations to make such attacks successful and to avoid detection. Finally,
we discuss potential mitigation for this threat including changes to the protocol itself.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 ARP
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a protocol commonly used to allow hosts
to resolve a network address to a link layer address.A common example of this is
converting an IP address into a MAC (Media Access Control) address. The ARP
standard is defined in RFC 826 [30].
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The ARP protocol is primarily carried out through a request and response mecha-
nism. Before sending a packet, a host checks its ARP table (which contains a mapping
from network addresses to link layer addresses) for a corresponding entry. If no such
entry is found for the network address, it will issue an ARP request. These queries are
sent to the broadcast address of the subnet, and causes any host using that network
address to send an ARP response. This response contains the link layer address of the
host with the matching network address. Upon receiving this response, the requester
will add an entry to its ARP table for that response. Each entry in the ARP table
will also have an associated timeout value. This timeout value determines how long
a host should wait before deleting an entry in the table. The timer used to time out
entries is usually reset to zero when the host observes network activity associated
with a given entry.
ARP also has several other functions, but the most relevant to our work are
announcements. ARP announcements, often known as gratuitous ARP messages,
are messages sent solely to update nearby hosts. They are not intended to garner a
response, but instead cause hosts who hear the announcements to update their ARP
tables in response to the announcement. This allows hosts who have recently changed
their IP address to update the ARP table entries of other hosts, preventing network
problems that might otherwise arise.
ARP spoofing is the process of falsifying ARP messages on a network. Because
ARP traffic is not authenticated, it can easily forged by an adversary. ARP spoofing
is most often used to allow an attacker to redirect traffic intended for another machine
to the attacker’s machine. This traffic can then be forwarded from the attacker to
the legitimate host, allowing the attacker to act as a man-in-the-middle. This type
of attack is often referred to as ARP poisoning.
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1.1.2 DHCP
The Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) is used to automate the distribution of
network configuration details such as: obtaining an IP address, learning the address
of the local gateway, and learning the address of DNS servers. DHCP is an extension
of the BOOTP protocol, and helps to bootstrap hosts so that they can access net-
works without manual configuration. The current DHCP standard is defined in RFC
2131[17].
When a device is configured for DHCP and connects to a network, it initially un-
dergo a process known as discovery. During discovery, a host sends DHCPDISCOVERY
messages to the broadcast address, looking for a DHCP server. When a server or
servers see these packets, they respond by sending a DHCPOFFER message to the initi-
ating client. The client device may receive multiple offers, but will select one offer, and
send a DHCPREQUEST message to the corresponding server. This server then allocates
the address, and returns a DHCPACK to confirm the assignment.
Because network addresses are not allocated indefinitely in DHCP, each allocation
is provided for a set period of time. This portion of time for which an address is
allocated is known as a lease, and each lease has a maximum duration. The expiration
of a lease allows the IP address to be reused by the same client, or other future clients.
When a client’s lease expires, the client may skip the discovery phase and instead send
a request directly to its previous DHCP server. If it receives an acknowledgment, its
lease has been renewed and it may continue using its previously allocated address. It
is not uncommon for hosts to attempt to renew their address in such a manner once
half of the lease duration has expired.
Like ARP, DHCP traffic is unauthenticated and easily forged DHCP spoofing is
an attack in which the adversary impersonates a DHCP server. Spoofing allows an
attacker to change the IP addresses of hosts on the network, or to prevent hosts from
being assigned IP addresses in a denial-of-service attack.
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1.1.3 Bridging
Bridging is a term that refers to forwarding packets on a packet-switched network.
Bridges that exist solely at layer two may be referred to as transparent. Transparent
bridging works by examining and forwarding packets based on information stored in
a forwarding table. Each entry in the forwarding table contains a link layer address
and a physical port. This port is used to send traffic to the associated address.
Forwarding tables are initially empty, but in most bridges are filled as traffic is
observed through a process known as learning. Whenever traffic flows through the
switch from an unknown source address, an entry is added for the unknown address
and the port its traffic arrived from. When traffic is destined for an unknown host,
the bridge usually floods the traffic to all of its ports to ensure delivery. Because
bridges are layer two devices, they are completely invisible to higher layers.
1.2 Overview of SNMP
SNMPv3 introduces many new security features over previous versions. These fea-
tures are intended to protect against a variety of threats including message modifica-
tion, message re-ordering, delaying of messages, replaying of messages, and eavesdrop-
ping on messages between agents [9]. There are additional protections to prevent an
attacker from impersonating an authorized user, from reading traffic, from replaying
traffic or reordering traffic, and to ensure that users have authorization to perform
certain actions. These protections can be divided into four primary mechanisms: the
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC), the encryption algorithms, the
View-based Access Control Model (VACM), and the mechanisms that are used to
ensure timeliness and correct ordering of messages. This section provides information
on how the SNMPv3 protocol operates, and explains several flaws in its operation.




SNMP is a protocol used to monitor networked devices. These devices often include
printers, routers, switches, servers, air conditioners, power distribution units (PDUs),
temperature sensors, and many other devices. Monitored devices run an SNMP agent
which typically communicates with a manager.
There are two primary types of requests, GetRequests and SetRequests. GetRequests
can be used by a manager to poll agents. SetRequests are used by the manager to
change the values of Object Identifiers (OIDs) on managed devices.
Another common SNMP mechanism is a trap. Traps are unsolicited SNMP mes-
sages which are usually sent in response to an event on the agent. An example would
be a printer sending a notification when its toner is depleted.
1.2.2 Security Levels
In order to provide integrity and confidentiality, SNMPv3’s User-based Security Model
(USM) allows for several different security levels depending on the user’s needs. We
focus specifically on the authPriv security level which requires the use of both au-
thentication and encryption [9].
1.2.3 Message Integrity
In order to guarantee the authenticity of a message, both the data origin and the
integrity of the message must be preserved. In SNMPv3 the way this is done is with
an HMAC using either MD5 or SHA-1 as the hashing algorithm [9]. The secret key
used with the HMAC is referred to as the authKey. Each username should have
multiple authKeys which are localized for use with different agents, but were all
created using the same passphrase[9]. The expectation is that a single username and
password may be used on multiple agents residing on different devices. This allows
multiple devices to use the same base password, but prevents compromise of that
password from affecting other machines configured with the same username. Keys
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are localized by hashing the authKey with the snmpEngineID to create a key that
is unique to each SNMP engine [9]. The snmpEngineID is a unique identifier for
each SNMP engine within an administrative domain. Without access to the original
authKey, an attacker can not construct a localized key, and without a valid localized
authKey an attacker can not generate the correct digest for any messages sent to or
from an SNMP agent. Additionally, since the entire message is used to generate the
HMAC, an attacker cannot modify any field in the message without changing and
thus invalidating the digest. Any messages received with an invalid HMAC and a
security level of authNoPriv or authPriv cause an authentication error [9].
1.2.4 Message Privacy
Inside SNMPv3 packets, there is a scopedPDU which contains the actual information
for requests. This scopedPDU is the portion of the packet that is encrypted when
privacy is desired [9]. The SNMPv3 standard currently supports encryption with the
Data Encryption Standard (DES), but there is a proposed standard which adds sup-
port for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9, 8]. The key used for encryption
is referred to as the privKey, and is localized in a similar manner to the authKey. It
is worth noting that the only information encrypted is the request or response itself.
1.2.5 Authorization
Before a request can go through, it must be authorized to do so by an Access Control
Model. In SNMPv3, one such model is the VACM [42]. The VACM determines
whether a type of access (read, write, or notify) is allowed to a certain OID. Access is
allowed or denied based on factors such as the type of access that is being requested
(read,write,notify), the username requesting it, and the security level of the request
(noAuthNoPriv, authNoPriv, authPriv).
7
1.2.6 Authoritative and Non-authoritative SNMP Engines
One important distinction is that of authoritative and non-authoritative SNMP en-
gines. For a message that expects a response, the sender is non-authoritative and
the receiver is authoritative. For a message that does not expect a response, the
sender is authoritative and the receiver is non-authoritative. The authoritative host’s
snmpEngineID is used to determine which pair of localized keys will be used for com-
munication [9].
1.2.7 Message Replaying, Reordering, and Delaying
To prevent replay attacks, message reordering, and delaying of messages, each message
includes timeliness indicators. These indicators of timeliness are the snmpEngineBoots
and snmpEngineTime values. The snmpEngineBoots value indicates the number of
times that the agent has re-booted or re-initialized since the snmpEngineID was
configured. The value of snmpEngineTime indicates the number of seconds since
snmpEngineBoots last changed [9]. The values that are used for communication are
the snmpEngineID and snmpEngineTime of the authoritative agent [9]. These values
are kept loosely synchronized on the non-authoritative agent, and they are resynchro-
nized every time communication occurs. SNMP agents will reject messages that are
outside of their time window (if they are off by plus or minus 150 seconds) if they are
authoritative[9]. If they are the non-authoritative agent, then they will only reject
older messages and resynchronize upon receipt of newer messages. These mechanisms
do not ensure that messages arrive in order within the time window, so there are sev-
eral additional measures that are taken to prevent SNMP set operations from arriving
out of order (most other SNMP operations may arrive out of order if they satisfy the
timeliness requirements).
One last method used to protect against replay attacks, is matching incoming
responses to previously sent requests. How to do this is not explicitly defined, but
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the protocol requires a method to discard responses that are not associated with an
outstanding request [9]. The protocol mentions a common way to do this, which
involves using a unique msgID per request, this msgID is included in the packet, and
having the request and response share the same msgID allows requests to be tied to
responses.
1.2.8 Discovery
The last feature of SNMPv3 that needs to be mentioned is that of discovery. Dis-
covery is the process by which non-authoritative SNMP engines learn about the
snmpEngineID of the authoritative engine. For authenticated communication, the dis-
covery process also learns the values of the authoritative engine’s snmpEngineBoots
and snmpEngineTime [9]. Of particular importance is the fact that both the re-
quest and the response messages used for discovery are sent with the security level
noAuthNoPriv, meaning they offer no guarantee of confidentiality or integrity.
1.2.9 Unreliable Transport
SNMP messages are traditionally sent over UDP[31], which may cause messages to
arrive out of order or not at all. Get and set requests are confirmed with a response,
so even though they are unreliable the manager knows a request has been received
when it gets a response back. For unacknowledged messages such as traps, however,
there is no response[13]. This means that traps can fail to arrive at the manager, but




The SNMP has seen widespread use since its creation in the late 1980s. SNMPv3,
however, is a more recent development. Some research suggests that even though
SNMPv3 is the current standard, and SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c have been declared
as historic, the older and less secure versions may still be the most widely used [35].
While a significant body of research exists for SNMPv3, it tends to be focused in
several areas.
2.1 Performance Tradeoffs
Much of the research on the SNMPv3 protocol has been focused on performance
trade-offs between SNMPv3 and SNMP version 2c (v2c) [16], or between SNMPv3
using USM and SNMPv3 over some other protocol. For instance, research has com-
pared SNMPv3’s performance to SNMPv2c used over other protocols such as Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) [18, 33], Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [33],
Secure Shell (SSH) [33], and Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) [23]. While these
studies are important, they do not focus on the security of various schemes so much
as they focus on network performance and the overhead associated with the chosen
encryption schemes.
2.2 Network Obstacles
Other research on SNMP has focused on challenges in the network, such as getting
past firewalls [32] by using a form of peer-to-peer network. Another study looked
at the challenge of monitoring devices behind NATs [29]. Both of these studies are
interesting, but the focus is more on adding features to SNMP than looking at its
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security or modifying the existing security scheme.
2.3 Alternate Security Schemes
Another common research area has been alternative ways to protect SNMP, either
by using a different protocol, or by making modifications to the current scheme,
SNMPv3. One such protocol was the Application Secure SNMP (APSSNMP) [41]
scheme. Because APSSNMP was later shown to be insecure [10], it has not been
widely deployed. Other schemes using public key cryptography [39, 28] or Diffie-
Helman key exchange [27] have been put forward, but never widely adopted. Perhaps
part of the issue with these schemes is that they do not adequately justify why the
security of SNMPv3, as it exists currently, is inadequate.
2.4 Known Vulnerabilities
There are few known security vulnerabilities in the SNMPv3 protocol. Several papers
have mentioned vulnerabilities, but for the most part these are not issues with the
protocol itself. In one of the papers on adding public key cryptography to SNMP the
authors fail to define specific vulnerabilities with the protocol, but instead state that
for the normal SNMPv3 scheme, the User-based Security Model (USM), “it is not
sufficient in a distributed Internet environment where malicious users can perform a
variety of attacks (e.g. via username and password interception, dictionary attacks,
session hijacking, etc) to gain unauthorized access to SNMP enabled resources” [39].
They later make the claim that “Modification of Information, in the form of inter-
cepted messages via ”Man in the Middle” attacks, is an inherent weakness in USM due
to the use of shared symmetric authentication and privacy keys.” This is incorrect,
because no information can be modified in an SNMPv3 packet due to the fact that
the authentication mechanism (which ensures integrity) takes in the entire packet
“as received on the wire”[9]. Because USM uses a secure HMAC scheme, the entire
message is protected from changes by an adversary unless they know the symmetric
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key. This would protect the scheme against a traditional MITM attack.
In another paper on adding public key cryptography to SNMP, the authors men-
tion two specific threats[28]. The first of these threats is a proposed MITM attack
that works by desynchronizing the clocks between the agent and manager so that the
manager and the agent can no longer communicate [28]. The reason we do not con-
sider this attack to be significant is that a MITM can almost always choose to drop
traffic intended for a host because the traffic going to that host must pass through
the MITM first. This would achieve a similar effect, is simpler, and is very difficult to
protect against. The other attack involves preventing the targeted host from sending
traps for failed authentication [28]. This too can be done by a MITM by simply
dropping the traffic. The argument presented is that, with notifications disabled,
an attacker can spend time attempting to crack the password without being noticed
[28]. While it is true that such an attack could work, if strong passwords are chosen
it should be infeasible.
2.5 Underlying Algorithms
Another important thing to look at is whether any weaknesses have been found in the
encryption and authentication algorithms being used. SNMPv3 can use either MD5,
or SHA-1 in a standard HMAC construction to provide authentication [9]. Several
papers have shown weaknesses in MD5 [37, 40, 25], and to a lesser extent SHA-1 [26],
but it seems unlikely that these issues will affect SNMPv3 because they all involve
finding collisions in the hashing algorithm. This means that an adversary still cannot
generate the HMAC without the secret key. For encryption, SNMPv3 uses the Data
Encryption Standard with Cipher Block Chaining (DES-CBC) to provide privacy [9].
Recent work has shown that due to the small key size, DES is vulnerable to brute force
attacks [20, 21]. This is a serious threat to the privacy goal of SNMPv3 messages,
because the encryption can be broken. Thankfully, there is a proposed standard which
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uses AES-128 [8], and which has been included in some SNMP implementations such
as Net-SNMP.
2.6 Implementation Issues
There have been a number of implementation specific vulnerabilities for SNMP over
the years [15]. For instance, the Oulu University Secure Programming Group tested
multiple SNMP implementations for errors when processing requests [38]. Most of
these vulnerabilities have been for SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, but there are likely oth-
ers which exist for SNMPv3. Our intent in this paper, however, is not to look at
weaknesses in specific implementations, but rather in the protocol itself.
2.7 Summary
So far little research has been focused on the overall security of the protocol. Re-
search has been done on improving performance, overcoming obstacles in the network,
coming up with alternate ways of securing the protocol, proving (or disproving) the
strength of the underlying algorithms, and discovering implementation specific vul-
nerabilities. What has not been researched is how the algorithms are used together,
and the assumptions that the protocol operates under. In many cases, violating such




We wanted to demonstrate our attacks under a realistic scenario. To do this, we made
decisions about what is and is not realistic. We also had to choose which factors to
simulate, and which not to simulate. In this section, we present the decisions we
made for our simulation, and our justifications for those decisions.
3.1 Devices and the Network
The devices that are monitored in our setup are all virtual machines (VMs) configured
on a virtual network. These virtual machines are running Fedora 16, a popular Linux
distribution.
The differences between VMs running an SNMP agent on Linux and real devices
running an SNMP agent will likely be minor. Nothing we are testing is specific to
Linux, the SNMP agent we use, or VMs. While real devices will likely use a different
agent and a different implementation, they should not behave noticeably differently.
The other major difference between the two is their computational power. While
our virtual machines could have at least an order of magnitude more computational
power than some embedded devices, none of our tests should notice this difference as
they should not generate significant load for any manager or managed agent.
Our VMs are configured with a virtual network. For most applications, virtual
networks should not perform significantly differently than physical networks. In this
case, our virtual network is composed of four hosts on the same broadcast domain
with two managed agents configured using DHCP.
The reason we chose to put all four hosts on the same broadcast domain, was
to more easily simulate a MITM attack. The virtual network we constructed was
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composed of two separate virtual networks bridged by our MITM. This allowed the
MITM to reliably see and modify all traffic traveling between the monitored agents
and the network monitor.
In most physical networks today, it might be unrealistic to expect to be on the
same broadcast domain due to the prevalence of switched networks. However, it is
not unreasonable to think that an adversary could become a MITM. On physical
networks, it is possible to have a traditional MITM. What is perhaps more likely
though, is that an attacker might use ARP poisoning on a switched network to route
traffic through their host. This is also a MITM, and easier to do in many cases. What
we demonstrate on a single broadcast domain is essentially the more traditional MITM
where we are physically located between the communicating hosts, but everything we
do should be possible using ARP poisoning.
3.2 DHCP
In the second proof of concept, at least one of the hosts used in the setup must be
configured to use the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, DHCP. This is done
because it is necessary for one of our attacks to be performed. It is hard to determine
generally how likely it is for an SNMP agent to use DHCP as opposed to a static
IP address. We contend that this is a realistic condition for several reasons. First,
SNMP agents are run on a diverse group of devices, and whether or not to use DHCP
is likely dependent on the role of the device. Second, our attacks only require that a
single agent be using DHCP to be performed. Third, even if using DHCP on such
devices were abnormal, such a decision should never negatively impact the security
of this protocol.
3.3 The Network Monitor
The manager, which we refer to as the network monitor, is a Linux virtual machine
running the Nagios network monitoring application. Nagios is a popular open source
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application used to monitor hosts on a network. For the most part, it is protocol
agnostic as checks are written in the form of plugins. These plugins are run by
Nagios and their output determines the check status. The specific plugin we use is
the “check snmp” plugin. It is included in many Nagios installations as a common
plugin for checking SNMP hosts.
Nagios with “check snmp” was chosen because both Nagios and the plugin are
popular and open source. It is possible that our choice of network monitoring software
could affect the difficulty of the attack. Both attacks are based on sending and
receiving discovery messages, and our setup may send more discovery messages than
others. The “check snmp” plugin and the way in which it is used require discovery
to occur before every check. It is possible other software may cache the results of
the discovery process, so as not to have to perform the process every time. Even in
such a case, our attacks are still valid because if at any point discovery occurs, we
can subvert the protocol.
3.4 Net-SNMP
Both the agents running on the hosts and the manager running on the network moni-
tor use the Net-SNMP implementation of SNMP. Net-SNMP is a popular open source
implementation of the SNMP protocol. It supports all versions of SNMP, and even
includes AES-128 support for encryption. Since our attacks are not dependent on
the implementation, our attacks should not be affected by choosing a different imple-
mentation. As mentioned previously it is possible that other implementations may
cache the results of the discovery process, but in such a case the attack should still
be possible although somewhat more difficult.
3.5 SNMP Agent Configuration
Our agent configuration was very simple. We created a single SNMPv3 username
with two different passwords, one for authentication and one for encryption. The
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username was given access to a single OID on each agent with a security level of
authPriv. This OID should be a value that differs between hosts, such as the OID for
hostname. We ensured that each agent had a different snmpEngineId, and therefore
different localized keys by looking in the Net-SNMP “snmpd.conf” file where the
agent stores its information.
The reason we used a single username for both devices is because that is the
configuration we claim is weak. It was the intention of the protocol, that a single
username could be used on multiple devices. This is also the reason for requiring
localized keys. We must consider the possibility that some networks may use a unique
userName for each device, and in such a case our attacks would be ineffective. This
is unlikely to be the case in most networks.
The reason we required SNMPv3 with a security level of authPriv, is because our
intention is to show that SNMPv3 can be subverted even using the strongest security
level. We understand that in some cases network operators may be less concerned
with the security of their SNMP traffic, but there are many cases in which the security
of the traffic is vital. By showing that SNMPv3 with authentication and encryption is
vulnerable to these attacks, we show that even if SNMPv3 is used, all of the security





The attacks we demonstrate highlight two main issues. The first is that the discovery
messages used to negotiate the authentication and encryption keys are neither au-
thenticated nor encrypted. This means that they can be modified without detection,
and an adversary can choose which localized keys are used. The second issue is that
communication between agents does not use strong authentication. Therefore a man-
ager can never be sure that the managed agent it is communicating with resides on a
given host. These two issues give rise to a variety of different attacks. The attacks we
explore in this paper are not problems with individual implementations of SNMPv3,
but rather with the protocol itself.
4.1 Reading Encrypted Requests for Hosts
Encrypted requests for other hosts can be read using a single compromised localized
key. There are many ways in which a localized key may become compromised. An
adversary can obtain a key by compromising a host running an SNMP agent, because
these keys are typically stored in plaintext. Alternately, if DES is being used, a brute-
force attack could be used to compromise a key given sufficient time[21]. Even if a
single key is compromised, the key does not provide an easy way of inferring other
keys or the passphrase used to generate those keys.
Once an adversary possesses a compromised key, they will force the manager’s re-
quests to use it. This is achieved by modifying or forging discovery messages between
the manager and a managed agent. Because these messages are completely unpro-
tected, an adversary can modify them at will. Messages are modified by replacing the
snmpEngineId in the discovery response with the snmpEngineId associated with the
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compromised key. Upon receiving the forged discovery response the manager does
not perform verification of the snmpEngineId but instead simply accepts it as correct.
The manager then associates the forged snmpEngineId with the managed agent.
Because the snmpEngineId is directly tied to a localized key, the forged snmpEngineId
will force the manager to use a specific key. This allows an adversary to choose which
key is used by the manager. By inserting the snmpEngineId corresponding to a known
key, an adversary can read the contents of the manager’s requests. Responses can not
be read in such a manner because managed agents will reject requests that do not
use their localized key.
4.2 Spoofing Requests with a Helper
Spoofing responses requires compromising neither a host nor a key. It instead relies
on the weak authentication and breaking a fundamental assumption of the protocol.
These vulnerabilities allow communication to be redirected such that the manager will
believe it is communicating with one managed agent when in fact it is communicating
with another.
As mentioned previously, the reliance of a manager on the discovery protocol can
be problematic. Because the manager does not otherwise know which snmpEngineId
is associated with an agent, an adversary can choose which keys are used for communi-
cation. To spoof requests, an adversary would choose the localized key corresponding
to the host they are using as a “helper”. The helper is a host the adversary will use
to spoof responses to the manager.
Another weakness is in the authentication of packets by the end hosts. Any time
a request or response is received, the only authentication that takes place is verifying
that the message was encrypted and authenticated with the right pair of keys. If
secure communication relies solely on using the correct keys, and an adversary can
choose which keys are used to create a message, then an adversary can manipulate a
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helper to forge responses for another host.
The final vulnerability is the assumption that hosts are tied to a network address.
Because an adversary can force messages to be encoded for a particular host, all they
need to do is to find a way to get the helper to accept the messages. One way to do
this is to find a host using the Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) to act as the
helper. Since DHCP can be spoofed, a host can be made to take on an IP address of
the adversary’s choosing. By modifying a host’s IP address and spoofing discovery
messages, an adversary can force a host to masquerade as any other host (provided





We used four virtual machines (VMs) set up on a virtual network to demonstrate
the attacks. Of these four machines, one is the manager which runs Nagios and a
DHCP server, one is the adversary (the MITM), and two are managed hosts. Both
managed hosts are configured using DHCP. Of these managed hosts, we designate
one as the target of our attack, and one as the helper. The helper will unknowingly
aid the attacker in spoofing responses to the manager.
5.2 Checks
To demonstrate the exploit we schedule two checks on Nagios. These checks get the
hostname of both the target and the helper using the “check snmp” plugin. The
target’s hostname check is the one we subvert. Our goal is to show that an adversary
can cause checks intended for the target to be encrypted with the helper’s key. We
then show that we can spoof the result of the target’s hostname check by using the








Figure 1: A GetRequest is forced to use a compromised key. This allows an attacker
to successfully read the request
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5.3 Reading SNMP Requests
An adversary who can read encrypted SNMP requests poses a threat because the
requests contain sensitive information. For instance, these messages could potentially
tell an adversary which devices are performing which duties (e.g., IDS). This will help
them avoid attracting attention while attempting to exploit services or compromise
machines. Both GetRequests and SetRequests also include identifiers that may
reveal sensitive information about devices. This is problematic in that a device’s
purpose, its manufacturer, and potentially its model may all be determined from
these requests. In the case of a SetRequest an adversary will have access to both the
identifiers used in the message and the values that would have been set (assuming
the adversary had not tampered with the request).
To capture requests intended for the target, the adversary’s VM is set up to act as
a network bridge. Packets are then captured and inspected using netfilter. netfilter[5]
allows iptables to capture and queue packets for processing in user space. We chose
to use netfilter because it allows us to use iptables rules to specify which packets are
queued for processing.
After capturing SNMPv3 discovery packets with netfilter we forward them if they
are bound for managed hosts. We only modify discovery packets that are en route
to the manager. For these packets, we replace the snmpAuthoritativeEngineId of
the target with the one corresponding to the compromised key, and recalculate the
checksums before allowing the packet through. This ensures that the time values in
the packet are correct, and that the manager will accept it.
Upon receipt of the modified discovery response, the manager begins using the
compromised key to encode GetRequests. The packets encoded with the compro-
mised key are not passed on to the managed hosts, but instead are written to a pcap
file for later analysis. This prevents the target’s SNMP agent from seeing the request











Figure 2: A GetRequest intended for the target is redirected to the helper.
a file, we analyzed the packets using Wireshark. Unfortunately Wireshark does not
currently allow users to directly enter the localized key. Instead they are required to
enter the passphrase and snmpEngineId in order for it to decrypt the stored packets.
5.4 Spoofing SNMP Agent Responses
An adversary with the ability to spoof SNMP agent responses has the power to
falsify messages and conceal malicious activity. By redirecting messages intended for
the target to the helper, an attacker can effectively hide activity that would normally
attract attention. If an attacker has an exploit to crash a company’s webservers,
they may want to hide their activity when using the exploit. One way to do this is
by redirecting checks from production webservers to other webservers such as those
running the company intranet. Redirecting those checks might allow an adversary to
take down the production webservers while having them appear normal to a network
monitoring application like Nagios.
Spoofing response messages using the helper is done in a similar manner to the
first attack. We configure the adversary’s VM as a network bridge and use netfilter
to modify and capture packets as was done previously. In addition to modifying
discovery packets, we will forward the captured encrypted requests in such a way
that the helper will respond to them.
To prevent the target from responding to queries, we drop DHCP traffic bound
to or from its Media Access Control (MAC) address. This means that when its lease
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Figure 3: Initially, Nagios correctly reports the hostname for both hosts. We then
use the helper to spoof SNMPv3 responses causing the target’s hostname to change
from “target” to “helper” (See “Status Information” column).
expires it is unable to renew it.
The helper’s DHCP requests are modified to make it rotate between IP addresses
rapidly. By setting the DHCP lease time to be very short (on the order of ten seconds
or less), we can cause the helper to rapidly cycle between the target’s IP address and
the helper’s original IP address. When the helper attempts to renew its lease (usually
when half of the lease interval has elapsed), we change its IP address to the one that
was not in use.
Because the helper’s IP address is being changed so rapidly, in many cases the
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) tables of other hosts will not be up to date.
To ensure the consistency of other host’s ARP tables, gratuitous ARP messages are
issued for both the target’s and the helper’s IP addresses and the helper’s MAC
address. This is done every time the helper’s DHCP lease is renewed.
Now that the helper cycles between the two IP addresses, the attacker can use it
to answer requests encoded with the helper’s key. Packets destined for the helper’s
current address are forwarded normally, where as packets for the other IP address
are queued up for later. Whenever the helper’s IP address changes, the cache is then
flushed by sending the stored packets. As long as the responses occur before the
requests time out, they will be indistinguishable to Nagios. In this case, the default
timeout value for the Nagios plugin’s requests is ten seconds.
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SNMP discovery packets have to be handled slightly differently because the target
is unreachable and the helper keeps cycling between IP addresses. This time discovery
packets going in both directions are modified. The initial packet from the network
monitor to the managed host is modified so that its IP address and MAC address
match the helper. This simplifies spoofing because the helper does most of the work
of responding to discovery messages. All that the adversary needs to do is make the
discovery packet appear to have come from the correct host. Because the timeout
value for discovery packets in the “check snmp” plugin is relatively short by default
(approximately three seconds), and because discovery packets can be modified at will,
there is no reason to cache them.
From the Nagios interface, the spoofing is difficult to detect. The differences
between the spoofed check and the original are that the spoofed check will sometimes
take longer to return, and the value it returns may differ from the “real” value.
While spoofing, both the helper and the target’s hostname checks appear to be
normal with the exception of the value they return. In this case, both the target’s and





6.1 Implications of the Attacks
We showed that an attacker can force SNMPv3 to use a particular pair of keys for en-
cryption and authentication. We also showed that the manager could not distinguish
between agents with the same username, but with different snmpEngineIds. This
means that using a single compromised pair of localized keys, an attacker can forge
responses for any request with the same username. Such an attacker is no longer
limited to relying on a helper to spoof responses, because they can spoof responses on
their own. In addition to attacks which subvert localized keys, we have shown that
an adversary can deceive a manager without needing to compromise a host or a key.
The impact of these attacks depends on what SNMP is being used to manage.
For instance, an attacker could use the first attack to potentially map a network
by determining the location of the functions executed by devices throughout (e.g.,
IDS, etc). The second set of attacks are potentially more damaging. For instance,
an adversary could reduce the reliability of certain systems by shutting off managed
UPS devices [11]. Alternatively, the adversary could potentially modify settings on
security appliances [14] or even change the temperature settings in a server room [6].
In short, such an attacker could modify the behavior of any IP-enabled device on the
network managed by SNMP.
These attacks may also extend to other SNMPv3 security models through a down-
grade attack. Because other SNMPv3 secure transport models are recommended to
fall back to USM “in times of network stress”[22], it may be possible to force other
security models to use USM.
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6.2 Difficulties for Attackers
There are a variety of different conditions which may make our attacks more difficult.
We will address a variety of possible obstacles an adversary could face when carrying
out an attack.
Uniqueness: Some hosts may have unique checks that are only run on that host.
This could cause issues for an attacker attempting to spoof checks because the helper
usually must be configured correctly to respond to a query. If it is not configured
correctly it may not respond correctly. By having the helper attempt to answer the
request, it could in fact return the wrong result and fail the check. This could draw
suspicion to the target, something an attacker would likely want to avoid. Unique
checks may be possible to detect by looking at and comparing the patterns of checks
across devices. A unique check would likely appear to be an outlier. We leave such
detection for future research.
Some checks may have different expected results on different hosts. An example
of such a check is a temperature sensor. In one area 75 degrees Fahrenheit may be
within the acceptable range, but in another area, temperatures exceeding 70 degrees
Fahrenheit may be considered abnormal. In such a case, spoofing a response with
the warmer value could cause a check to fail for some hosts but not others. Attackers
would likely wish to avoid this, but unlike the previous case this check will not be
distinguishable in advance based on the pattern of checks. Also, because the results
of a request are what an attacker would need to be able to read, the first attack would
not be useful for guessing the expected value of the check.
An attacker could likely determine if a spoofed check was failing however. In
many cases, Nagios and other similar systems are configured to perform multiple
checks before determining if a check has failed. This is done to make the systems
more robust. Because these retries are often scheduled with shorter intervals of time
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between them than successful checks, they may be distinguishable from normal checks.
An attacker could potentially attempt to spoof checks one at a time and watch for
retries. If an unexpected check occurs, they would suspect that their check most
likely failed and might then stop spoofing that check. If done quickly enough, this
probing might avoid detection by the network monitor. Alternatively, Nagios might
only try once before failing. In that case a failed check may have a different retry
interval than a successful check. Such a failure would be evident to the monitoring
software, but would not likely draw much attention if it resolved itself quickly.
The probing methodology mentioned above could also be used by an attacker to
spoof traffic without using a helper. In such a case, the attacker might not know
what the expected response to a request is. They could likely try different values and
then use Nagios’ behavior to confirm their guesses.
Custom Checks: In some cases, there could be requests for unknown OIDs. If the
attacker attempts to forge these checks without a helper, they may not know what
kind of response is expected. In this case they can likely use the probing methodology
previously described. The difficulty of guessing a correct value for such a check is likely
to vary based on the type of check.
Other Checks: Even though an attacker may be able to subvert SNMP traffic,
checks may be run using other protocols. An adversary can allow this traffic through
to the target host if they are not using a helper to perform spoofing. If they are
using a helper, it may not be feasible to forward the non-SNMP traffic to the helper.
Either way, the adversary will still have to either work around or subvert those other
checks. Being able to subvert SNMP does not necessarily mean that all monitoring
can be defeated.
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Spoofing Multiple Hosts: In some situations an attacker may wish to spoof mul-
tiple targets using a single helper. This should be possible, but there will be a limit
to the number of hosts that can be spoofed simultaneously for a single helper. An
adversary could likely spoof checks for additional hosts by increasing the number of
helpers.
Unique Username: In certain, rare cases, there may be a username that is only
used on a single host. In this case, the described attacks will be ineffective because
there is only a single localized key.
Avoiding Detection: If someone were actively looking for these attacks, they
would be relatively easy to detect. For all of these cases, it should likely appear sus-
picious when more than one IP address appears to be using the same snmpEngineId.
Someone looking to detect this kind of attack can also attempt to detect when the
snmpEngineId associated with an IP address changes, because snmpEngineIds change
relatively rarely (usually only when a device is replaced or the software reinstalled).
This kind of detection would applies to all of the attacks mentioned, including spoof-
ing without a helper.
Another way to detect the attack is by looking at the ARP traffic generated.
Having multiple IP addresses assigned to the same MAC address is not necessarily
unusual, but for many devices with SNMP agents it will be.
For an adversary attempting to read encrypted requests, they can not forward
requests sent with their key because the managed agent would be unable to answer the
request. As was mentioned previously, dropping such requests prevents the managed
agent from notifying the manager of an invalid key. This may also be noticed because
it prevents the manager’s queries from receiving a response. One solution to this may
be to attempt to read messages probabilistically. Because SNMPv3 messages are
usually sent via UDP, checks may be considered unreliable or allow multiple retries.
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By modifying requests infrequently, an adversary’s activity may be assumed to be
the result of network instability.
Devices are not Configured with DHCP: If no SNMP agents are being run
on machines configured with DHCP, or if none of the machines that are using DHCP
are suitable as a helper, the second attack will not be possible. It is hard to predict
how often this will be the case. This will only hinder an adversary who is dependent
on a helper.
Choosing a Helper: A potential drawback to using a helper is that changes to
the helper’s IP address might cause problems for other services. An adversary would
likely want to choose their helper carefully. A host that is relatively stable and
infrequently used would be the best candidate. This host also would likely need to be
able to respond to the same checks that the target does. Since an adversary using a
helper presumably does not have a compromised key pair, they will have to use other
methods to locate a similarly configured helper. It is still possible to determine a
great deal of information about a potential helper by looking at its traffic, especially
the pattern of SNMP requests being sent to it.
Even without being able to see what checks are being run, an attacker can tell
the username that requests are being run as and when they occur. Because systems
such as Nagios perform checks at regular intervals, and the interval lengths vary
depending on the checks, an attacker may be able to infer which hosts are running
similar checks by comparing the timing of the encrypted requests. Contributing to
this effect is the fact that hosts are often constructed using templates which include
similarly configured checks. By looking at these patterns of checks, an adversary
may be able to construct a signature of sorts for each template. This could allow
for identification of devices with similar purposes and similar checks. Developing
signatures for similarly configured hosts based on the pattern of their checks is a
30
topic left for future work.
6.3 Fixing the Vulnerability
The quickest way for administrators to prevent the spoofing attack with a helper
is to ensure that none of the devices running SNMP agents are using DHCP. We
understand this may not always be practical or necessary, as there are some cases in
which the reliability of checks is not paramount.
Even if no agents are configured to use DHCP, administrators should be wary of
allowing usernames to be used on machines with differing levels of security. As we
showed earlier, compromise of any machine with that username compromises that
username for all machines. In many cases localized keys are simply stored in a file on
the device, so obtaining a key on a compromised host is not difficult. The only way
to prevent compromised localized keys from being used maliciously is to prevent the
network monitor from using the discovery process.
One way to protect the discovery process would be to use IPsec. IPsec protects
the transport layer, meaning the discovery process will be protected automatically.
Such an approach would make our attacks impossible.
Because using IPsec is not always feasible, the best solution is to fix the protocol
itself. These issues will persist as long as the discovery process is relied upon in its
current state. We would recommend removing the discovery mechanism altogether,
but we recognize that it may still be useful for helping to synchronize time values.
Instead, the manager should be required to keep a list containing each snmpEngineId
and its associated network address and to solely use discovery for synchronizing clocks.
This would remove any ambiguity about which host is being communicated with,
and prevent an attacker from being able to determine the key. The list would have
to be manually maintained, which would unfortunately put an additional burden on
the administrator. There are other potential ways to modify discovery such that
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it is protected, but such modifications would be harder to deploy. In addition to
preventing all of the attacks mentioned, this approach would require no modification
to the agents, and minimal changes to the protocol.
6.4 Similarities to SCADA Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are often used to moni-
tor and manage industrial processes and infrastructure. SCADA systems use a variety
of network protocols to communicate, some of which share similarities with SNMP.
These protocols are often vulnerable due to poor (or nonexistent) authentication and
a lack of encryption[24]. An example of this is the Distributed Network Protocol
(DNP3). Even though DNP3 is the most widely used protocol for SCADA systems
in the energy sector, it has traditionally been vulnerable to a variety of attacks.[19].
DNP3 is similar to SNMP for a variety of reasons. One is that, like SNMP, both
protocols are relatively old and were designed with reliability as their first priority[2].
Like SNMP, early versions of DNP3 were vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks
that would enable the interception, modification, and falsification of information[19].
Both protocols neglected to provide strong authentication due to its complexity. Like
SNMP, later versions of the protocol attempted to retrofit security with minimal
changes to the protocol. For instance, secure authentication was added to the stan-
dard in 2010 by using an HMAC[2]. The authentication in DNP3 differs from that
in SNMPv3 in that it uses a challenge/response mechanism where as SNMPv3 only
uses a single message to authenticate. It also attempts to maintain perfect forward
secrecy by using a different authentication key for each session. It provides a key
change mechanism with the intention that hosts’ keys will be changed frequently.




The current protection afforded by SNMPv3 is not satisfactory. We have demon-
strated that under reasonable conditions both the confidentiality and authenticity
of messages can be violated. We have explained how, even with the use of strong
cryptography, invalid assumptions can cause the protocol to fail. In SNMPv3, the
protocol relied on the fact that messages could not be modified to protect the commu-
nication against redirection. This failed to take into consideration that an adversary
could change an agent’s IP address at will in some cases. It also relied on an unpro-
tected mechanism to determine, identity and to choose which key pair to use. We
have shown how this can be used by an adversary to force the manager into using a
specific key pair.
We have explored how these vulnerabilities can be used by an adversary to hide
sabotage done to web servers, backup servers, and other vital services. Because of the
ubiquity of this protocol for use with embedded devices, these weaknesses may even
have cyber-physical implications. Although these vulnerabilities are problematic, they
can be overcome. We have presented a way to fix these issues with minimal changes
to the agents or the protocol.
In the future we hope to do research into identifying hosts configured with similar
checks based on the patterns of checks being run on them. The ability to do so would
allow adversaries to gain knowledge about these systems without needing to read the
contents of the requests or modify traffic.
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Network monitoring is a necessity for both reducing downtime and ensuring
rapid response in the case of software or hardware failure. Unfortunately, one of the
most widely used protocols for monitoring networks, the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3), does not offer an acceptable level of confidentiality or integrity
for these services. In this paper, we demonstrate two attacks against the most current
and secure version of the protocol with authentication and encryption enabled. In
particular, we demonstrate that under reasonable conditions, we can read encrypted
requests and forge messages between the network monitor and the hosts it observes.
Such attacks are made possible by an insecure discovery mechanism, which allows
an adversary capable of compromising a single network host to set the keys used by
the security functions. Our attacks show that SNMPv3 places too much trust on the
underlying network, and that this misplaced trust introduces vulnerabilities that can
be exploited.
